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Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the
Ambiguous Welfare E¤ects of Forced Open Access: A Two-sided
Model
1 Introduction
Academic journals act as platforms upon which authors communicate their ideas to readers. Hence,
journals need to attract both authors and readers in order to be able to provide their service.
However, the interrelationship between authors and readers on the journal platform is more complex
than a simple meeting place where ideas are exchanged. Readers attract authors to a journal, and
authors attract readers to a journal, and both are attracted to higher-quality journals (Ellison,
2002; Heintzelman and Nocetti, 2009). Thus, the market for academic journals constitutes a two-
sided market (Filistrucchi, Geradin and van Damme, 2013; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet
and Tirole, 2002 & 2006; Rysman, 2009). Journal editors make decisions regarding readers and
authors that are crucial to the nal outcome of the quality that the journal achieves. Suppose that
a journal acts to maximise prot.1 In such a scenario, the journal must decide on the subscription
price for reader access, the author fee (submission and/or publication fees), and the overall quality
of the journal, all with the objective of achieving maximal prot.
We study the following aspects of journal management. First, is it possible that one of the two
prices (reader or author price) is optimally set to zero? Second, is a journal that does optimally
set the reader price to zero (i.e. an "open-access" journal) more likely to be characterised by a
lower quality level than a closed-access journal (i.e. one with a strictly positive subscription price
for readers)? Finally, we analyse the e¤ect of forced open access associated with the removal of
copyright for academic works on author prices, journal quality and social welfare.2
These questions have important policy implications for the following reasons. The traditional
subscription-fee-based publication model involves relatively low author prices but high reader prices.
In contrast, the open-access model allows readers to access papers free of charge over the Internet
and serves to increase the author price. However, the question whether open access can dominate
the traditional publication model and be welfare-enhancing as well as sustainable in long-run equi-
librium depends on the elasticities of demand on the author and reader side (McCabe and Snyder,
2005 & 2007). In turn, the elasticity of author demand depends on the impact of open access on
the quality of the journal, i.e. we take quality to be the expected number of citations per paper
published (the expected impact factor). On the one hand, if open access leads to an increase in
journal quality, author demand may be su¢ ciently inelastic to support high author prices that
are "necessary for open access to be sustainable in long-run equilibrium" and high enough for the
1Other objectives may also be considered  the journal might act in order to maximise its impact factor, or it
might act in order to maximise readership (di¤usion of ideas published).
2We are interested in this aspect because of the recent, provocative paper by Stephen Shavell (2010) that advocates
abolition of copyright in scientic publications. See also Towse, Handke and Stepan (2008) for a thorough overview
of the economics literature on copyright law.
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open-access equilibrium to have positive welfare properties (McCabe and Snyder, 2013a, p. 3). On
the other hand, if open access leads to a decrease in journal quality, the opposite result may hold
true.
In the present paper, we model a journal as two-sided platform in order to account for some of
the principal aspects of this complex market, i.e. optimal journal pricing, access to research outputs
and journal quality (Bergstrom, 2001; Dewatripont et al., 2006; Gans, 2000; Jeon and Menicucci,
2006; McCabe, 2004). Thus, the paper adds to a relatively young body of literature that consid-
ers academic journals in two-sided markets (Jeon and Rochet, 2010; McCabe and Snyder, 2007;
McCabe, Snyder and Fagin, 2013). It is related to the monopoly-platform model by Armstrong
(2006). In contrast to Armstrong (2006), however, the platforms objective is to optimally choose
its quality in addition to the optimal reader subscription price and author fee. Our paper is
most closely related to McCabe and Snyder (2005), who also study the academic journal market
by means of a two-sided market model. Similarly, we consider a prot-maximising, monopolistic
journal3 and investigate the question of how journal quality is related to open-access publishing.
McCabe and Snyder (2005) nd that the equilibrium reader price charged by a monopolistic journal
is weakly increasing in journal quality, which implies that low-quality journals are more likely to
adopt open access if an authors benet of having her article read exceeds the readers marginal
e¤ort and reading cost. However, they also argue that once this condition fails to hold the result
will be reversed, i.e. higher-quality journals will favour open access. Our paper di¤ers from McCabe
and Snyder (2005) in two important aspects. First, it is the nature of the (non-linear) externalities
between authors and readers of a journal rather than e¤ort and distribution cost that determines
whether open access is a feature of low or high-quality journals. Second, we treat journal quality
di¤erently. McCabe and Snyder (2005) assume that an increase in journal quality (editorial talent)
has ceteris paribus a direct negative overall e¤ect on authors as the acceptance rate decreases.
Bad articles are identied as bad articles with a higher probability and thus are more likely to be
rejected. In contrast, we assume that, on the quality range under study, authorsoverall returns to
choosing a journal increase in journal quality (Hamermesh, 1992; Heintzelman and Nocetti, 2009).
Stated di¤erently, the increase in academic prestige of a publication in a higher-quality journal
more than outweighs the direct negative e¤ects due to lower acceptance rates and longer response
times (Oster, 1980). This assumption is further motivated by Ellison (2002), who suggests that
the benets from publishing in higher-quality journals, i.e. the rate at which papers published
in the top-tier journals are cited relative to the rate at which papers published in the second-tier
journals are cited, increased signicantly from 1970 to 2000. It is in these two respects (non-linear
externalities and positive overall returns of authors to choosing a higher-quality journal) that we
believe our paper adds to McCabe and Snyder (2005) in order to address the before-mentioned
countervailing e¤ects that exist in the real world of academic publishing.
Our model can also be interpreted as a model of monopolistic competition if we consider ca-
3For instance, Bergstrom (2001, p. 190) suggests that despite the possibility of new entrants into the industry and
despite competition from nonprot journals [. . . ] the presence of potential competitors does not necessarily prevent
monopoly pricingdue to a coordination failure within academia.
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pacity constraints on both sides of the market, i.e. that the number of readers and authors is
limited. In this modied setup, we revisit the welfare e¤ects of copyright protection and open ac-
cess. The main structural assumptions in the model, which are linear demand and either linear or
concave production functions, are relatively standard. We carry out an analysis based on numerical
simulation.
We nd several new results that add to the literature on two-sided journal markets and the
economics of open access.4 First, if readers benet less from the marginal author than authors
do from the marginal reader, open access is rather a feature of high-quality journals. In contrast,
if the diminishing returns lie on the other side of the market, open access is more likely to be a
feature of low-quality journals. Second, we analyse the e¤ects of a removal of copyright on journals,
academics and social welfare. We nd that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will
likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal prots, and may increase social
welfare. It is in this respect that we believe our analysis is di¤erent from existing works such as
Jeon and Rochet (2010) and McCabe and Snyder (2007).
In contrast to the existing literature, we have deliberately opted for a reduced-form model rather
than a behavioural model based on individual utility maximisation. Thus, we eliminate the need
for a host of simplifying assumptions at the individual level. Instead, any assumptions are made
at the reduced-form level (i.e. assumptions on the actual demand and supply type relationships
faced by journals, rather than assumptions on specic elements of individual behaviour).5 By using
a reduced-form model, rather than sticking with the strongly behavioural models that currently
populate the literature, we hope to provide a contrasting point of view, that is both interesting and
valid, on the issue of optimal journal management.
2 Model
A journal is a set of papers. Papers are written by authors (and each author can submit at
most one paper) and are consumed by readers. Readers only have the option to purchase the
entire set of papers in the journal, and cannot disaggregate the journal content for price reductions.
Thus, the journal may be thought of as being a single volume (or several issues) of a particular
title. The journal chooses quality, q, the price charged to readers, pr, and the price charged to
authors, pa.
In this paper we treat quality as an exogenous choice variable of the journal. We neither
specify or model how this choice is made, nor do we dene exactly what the quality variable
measures in terms of precise statistical information. In reality, quality is controlled by the journal
via the referee process. Quality is taken to represent any given variable, under the control (either
direct or indirect) of the journal, indicating to the academic community that the papers published
have some guarantee of being novel, interesting and valuable. For example, we could take quality
4For a general discussion of open-access policy and the economics of open access, see Suber (2012).
5Note that assumptions at the individual behavioural level in the end all just condition the nal reduced form of
the model anyway. Thus they could always be restated as assumptions directly on the reduced form.
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to be the expected number of citations per paper published (the expected impact factor). Quality,
then, is understood to be a measure of the perceived value of a given journal as an outlet for
scientic information. The higher this quality, the more readers value reading the journal, and the
more authors value publishing in it.6
Our treatment of quality reects our reduced-form strategy there is no need to specify how
the journal chooses its quality. Once we take into account how this choice a¤ects a journals prots
through the e¤ects it has upon both readers and authors we only need to accept that each journal
is able to choose its quality standard. All that is required is that quality is somehow chosen by the
journal. Once that choice is made, it can be readily discerned by all market participants, and it is
something that is desirable by both readers and authors. Considering the real world of academic
publishing this seems reasonable as it is generally not di¢ cult for market participants (readers and
authors) to be able to rank journals according to their perceived quality, which may be thought
of as a measure of the desirability of reading the journal, or of publishing in it. As long as a rank
order of journals in terms of quality can be constructed, any measure that reects that rank order
works for our variable q. That is, for any i and j, if journal i is ordinally ranked ahead of journal
j, then any two numbers qi > qj can be used. Our assumption is simply that such a measure for
this ranking exists,7 and is commonly observed by all participants.
The journal acts in order to maximise prots. Given the choice (q; pr; pa), the number of readers
that the journal attracts is endogenously given by nr(q; pr; na), and the number of authors that are
included in the subscription that is sold to readers is endogenously given by na(q; pa; nr). Both the
number of readers and the number of authors are determined in part by the quality chosen. The
number of readers (authors) has a direct dependence on the price charged to readers (authors).
The relationship between the number of readers and the price charged to authors, and between
the number of authors and the price charged to readers, is indirect. The number of readers is
(partially) determined by the number of authors, and vice versa.8 Since the number of authors
published depends upon the choices made by the journal, this is a long-runanalysis.
Here we can already see that the optimal pricing strategy of a monopoly journal is by no means
transparent. It could happen that with low quality it is still optimal to charge a positive reader price
but no author charge. In that way, for a given quality, the number of authors is large, which also
gives value to readers, thereby compensating for the low quality variable. Likewise at high quality
it may turn out to be optimal not to charge readers, and rather to charge authors a publishing fee
6For example, one might also want to interpret quality as being the monetary equivalent payo¤ to readers from
reading, and also as the monetary equivalent payo¤ for authors in publishing. The greater q is, the more valuable is
the journal both to read and to publish in. Under such an interpretation, one would expect the number of readers
to increase as the net monetary benet from reading, q   pr, increases (assuming it is positive), and the number of
authors to increase as their net monetary benet, q pa, increases (again assuming it is positive), both of which seem
reasonable from a behavioural perspective, assuming of course that one does not run into a binding constraint on the
actual supply of either readers or authors. We discuss the issue of binding capacityconstraints below.
7Kóczy and Nichifor (2013) discuss a variety of popular ranking mechanisms, and suggest a particular ranking,
along with the corresponding values of qi, that satises a set of very reasonable axioms.
8The journal sells space to authors. Hence, the author price refers to the cost for an author to publish one paper.
On the other hand, once the journal content is found, the subscription price to readers gives a reader access to all
the papers in that issue of the journal.
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(this maximises readership, which in turn makes it more interesting for authors to publish). The
optimal pricing strategy, and also the optimal choice of quality, will depend on the shapes of the
two reduced-form equations nr and na, and the interrelationships between them.
Our assumptions reect reality. Readers choose to read a journal depending on its content
(which is given by the number of papers in it, na, and the quality of those papers, q), and the
price charged to readers, pr. Authorswillingness to publish in a journal depends on the quality
of the journal, q, the audience reached, nr, and the cost of publishing, pa.9 The fact that the
two functions nr(q; pr; na) and na(q; pa; nr) are interdependent, i.e. the value of each depends (in
part) upon the value of the other, captures the two-sided market feature of academic journals as
platforms for readers and authors.
We can interpret the functions nr(q; pr; na) and na(q; pa; nr) in two di¤erent ways, both of
which will be exploited in the paper. First, for given values of q and na, say q and na, we should
understand nr(q; pr; na) to be a demand function in the sense that it relates the price for reading
to the number of readers who purchase. On the other hand, for given values of q and pr, say q
and pr, we should understand nr(q; pr; na) to be a production function, in the sense that papers
(here, authors) are what attract readers to a journal. In the same way, na(q; pa; nr) is again a
demand function, and na(q; pa; nr) is a production function (this time, reecting the dependence
of the number of authors that are attracted to a journal on the number of readers of that journal).
For i; j = r; a and i 6= j, we assume @ni@pi < 0;
@ni
@nj
> 0 and @
2ni
@n2j
 0. Thus, the demand functions
are negatively sloped and the production functions are positively sloped and (weakly) concave.
We also assume @nr@q > 0 and
@na
@q > 0. First, readers prefer higher-quality papers. Second,
authors also prefer higher-quality journals. The latter assumption will only hold locally, on a range
of quality levels. The higher the quality of a journal, the greater is the willingness of authors to
supply papers to that journal (for CV e¤ects and the fact that higher-quality journals are likely to
reach a larger audience, and thus are more likely to be cited). But, the greater the quality hurdle,
the lower is the acceptance rate. Thus, while a high-quality journal will have a larger set of papers
to choose from, they are also more selective in their choosing.10 Almost certainly, the number of
published papers is a non-monotone function of quality, since at some very high quality levels the
quality lter will outweigh the e¤ect of increased submissions. Indeed, we can even envisage that
there could be a su¢ ciently high quality level such that no authors exist that can actually write a
paper of such quality.11 However, throughout the paper, we assume that for the relevant range of
quality levels there are more published authors as quality increases. This assumption is based upon
observation of the real world of academic publishing. At least in the eld of economics journals,
those at the top of the quality ladder are typically able to publish many papers, while it is the
9For instance, pa is the sum of submission fee and publication fee.
10Note that we abstract from modeling the referee process, under which papers are screened for quality. Here,
all that is important is to recognise that na is the number of papers that end up being published, and that will be
determined by the number of papers that are submitted (decreases with author price and increases with number of
readers), and the quality of the journal. The assumption that the number of papers published increases with quality
reects the assumption that submissions of su¢ cient quality increase in quality.
11See, for example, the Journal of Universal Rejection (http://www.universalrejection.org/).
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journals of lower perceived quality that may struggle with nding papers to publish. Hence, it
appears that the threshold quality level for authors to decline as quality increases has not been
reached for any economics journal that we are aware of.
Our assumption that the number of published papers increases with quality is not innocuous
to the results of our model. As we shall see, in the model we end up with prots being a strictly
increasing function of quality, and thus each journal wants to increase quality as much as possible.
However we should not interpret this result as implying that journals will set quality at an innitely
high level as we are only carrying out a local analysis in terms of quality. If we were to carry out
a full consideration of the non-monotone functional relationship between the number of papers
published and the journals quality, there would exist a su¢ ciently high level of quality such that
prots end up decreasing with quality as it becomes extremely di¢ cult to nd papers of su¢ cient
quality to publish. In such a model there would be a nite optimal level of quality.12 We will
re-address this assumption later on, once we have found the optimal quality-setting strategy for
the journal.
Figure 1: Two-sided market: demand and production functions and prot
Figure 1 illustrates both the demand curve aspect and the production function aspect of the
journal platform, always taking quality to be xed. The upper left-hand [lower right-hand] panel
shows the demand curve aspect of nr(q; pr; na) [na(q; pa; nr)], and the upper right-hand panel shows
the production function aspects. Figure 1 highlights a very important aspect of the journals market.
It is two-sided, and so the choice of reader price (a determinant of the number of readers) cannot
be taken independently from the choice of author price (which is a determinant of the number of
authors). There is only one consistent choice in this graph, which is labeled as point p0 in the lower
12We are currently elaborating such a model.
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left-hand panel. Only with that choice of prices will the number of authors (nea) be consistent with
the number of readers (ner), where the superscripts
e refer to endogenous equilibrium values.
Imagine that, from the situation drawn in Figure 1, the journal decided to increase the reader
price while leaving the author price unchanged. Such an increase in the reader price will cause a
shift along the demand curve for the number of readers, thus reducing nr. The production function
for readers will itself shift, since it is parameterised by the reader price. Since we assume that
the number of readers is a decreasing function of the price for reading, the production function
will shift downwards. There is a resulting shift along the production function for the number of
authors. Next, the demand function for the number of authors is parameterised by the number
of readers. The number of readers has decreased, which will shift the demand function for the
number of authors inwards. Finally, the number of authors has also been decreased, which will
shift the demand function for the number of readers inwards. These shifts will continue until a new
equilibrium point is attained. We assume throughout that the equilibrium process just described is
stable, in the sense that for any (q; pr; pa), the curves adjust such that there is a mutually compatible
pair (nr; na).
2.1 Prot-maximising decisions
Following Jeon and Rochet (2010), we study the case of an online journal, rather than a journal that
publishes in hard-print format. This simplies the analysis as it allows us to realistically assume
that the marginal cost of supplying readers is zero.13 This assumption is a rst approximation
for the changing conditions under which an online-only journal supplies its content in the digital
era for the following reasons. First, as McCabe and Snyder (2013a, p. 1) put it, the advent of
the Internet [. . . ] e¤ectively reduces the cost of distributing the journal to readers close to zero.
Second, authors typically produce and format the electronic les and data themselves (Hilty, 2005).
At least in economics, authors usually follow precise author guidelines and use the style les and
templates provided by the journal, which thereby signicantly reduces the cost of processing of ac-
cepted papers, i.e. copyediting and typesetting. Third, for submission and peer-review, commercial
publishers frequently use cost-e¤ective web-based editorial end-to-end systems that signicantly re-
duce the journals cost of handling a submitted article and processing an authors account. Fourth,
the referee process is typically free of charge for the publishers (Hilty, 2005). The prots earned by
the journal are (q; pr; pa) = pr  nr + pa  na = r + a.
Figure 1 illustrates the prots derived from the reader side of the market (r) and the author
side of the market (a). The sum of these two rectangular areas is the total prot. Note that a
unilateral increase of the reader price decreases the prot in the author market since the author
price stays constant and the number of authors decreases. In addition, it may either increase or
decrease the prot in the reader market (it goes from a tall thin rectangle to a shorter but wider
one).
13For simplicity, we also assume the xed costs of the journal to be zero. Fixed costs can easily be incorporated.
However, they will have no e¤ect on the model, except for giving a shut-down condition.
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The journal chooses (q; pr; pa) in order to maximise its prots. We model this recursively. First,
hold quality xed at some level, q. Given that quality, we analyse the optimal pricing policy of the
journal, p(q) = (pr(q); pa(q)). Considering these optimal prices for each quality level, we derive
the optimal quality that the journal should choose.
Firstly, for any given (q; pr; pa) it is necessary to simultaneously solve the two equations nr(q; pr; na)
and na(q; pa; nr) for the two equilibrium levels of readers and authors, ner(q; pr; pa) and n
e
a(q; pr; pa).
The prot of the journal is (q; pr; pa) = pr ner(q; pr; pa)+ panea(q; pa; pr). The derivatives with
respect to the two prices are given by @@pi = n
e
i +pi
@nei
@pi
+pj
@nej
@pi
, where i; j = r; a and i 6= j. Carrying
out the implied second derivatives, it turns out that a su¢ cient condition for prots to be concave
in the price pi is @
2ni
@p2i
 0 and @2ni@nj@pi  0. Assuming concavity, the two rst-order conditions for
optimal choices of the two prices are @@pr = 0 and
@
@pa
= 0. The simultaneous solution gives us the
two optimal prices as functions of the quality, pr(q) and pa(q). The indirect prot function is then
given by
(q) = pr(q) ner(q; pr(q); pa(q)) + pa(q) nea(q; pr(q); pa(q)):
This function is maximised with respect to q.
2.2 A simplied model
In order to see how the model works, we assume three di¤erent scenarios, each of which is charac-
terised by linear demand functions for both readers and authors. They di¤er with respect to the
degree of concavity of the two production functions. Specically, in scenario 1 we assume that both
production functions are a¤ected by diminishing returns (i.e. they are both concave). In scenario
2 the production of readers, taking authors as an input, has diminishing returns (i.e. is concave)
while the production of authors, taking readers as the input, is linear. In scenario 3 the reader
production function is linear and the author production function is concave.
In each of the three scenarios, demand is given by a linear form, with vertical intercept (i.e.
maximum feasible price) equal to q.14 Thus, greater levels of quality correspond to parallel shifts
of the two demand curves. We have no reason to assume that the e¤ect of a marginal change in
quality upon the demand curve of readers is any di¤erent than the same e¤ect for authors. So in
the interest of keeping our model as uncluttered as possible, we assume that this e¤ect is equal for
both sides of the market ().15
14Our linear reader (author) demand equation is a function of quality, but not a function of the number of authors
(readers), for the following reason. In the real world of academic publishing journals do not commit to a given number
of authors (readers), but there is a commitment to quality. The reader (author) price is charged based on quality,
not the thickness (readership) of the journal.
15The assumption of linear demand is, of course, only intended as a rst approximation to any real-life scenario.
Non-linear forms increase the complexity of the model enormously, with no qualitative change in the results that are
obtained. Basically the linear form is the least complex way in which we can assure that when there are no readers,
nr = 0, then no authors are attracted to the journal, so that na = 0. Likewise, no authors implies no readers. This
feature can also be incorporated into non-linear demand forms, but as stated above, this leads to signicant analytical
complexity with no real gain in the models output.
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2.2.1 Scenario 1: Diminishing returns on both sides
Here, we assume nr =
p
na (q   pr) and na = pnr (q   pa), which we rewrite as
nr =
p
nar; (1)
na =
p
nra; (2)
where i  q   pi for i = r; a. Recall that both of nr and na are constrained to be positive, so
we are restricted to parameter values such that i > 0 for i = r; a. That is, we can only consider
prices that satisfy pi < q for i = r; a.
It is easy to show that the solution to the two equations (1) and (2), outside of the trivial
solution at (0; 0), lies at nr =
 
4r
2
a
 1
3 and na =
 
2r
4
a
 1
3 . The prots of the journal are:
 = prnr + pana = pr
 
4r
2
a
 1
3 + pa
 
2r
4
a
 1
3 :
The prot function is perfectly symmetric in the two prices. That is, the function is of the form
 = f(pr; pa) + f(pa; pr), where f(x; y)  x

(q   x)4 (q   y)2
 1
3
. Thus, it makes no di¤erence
to the problem how we label our price variables. In the optimal solution it must be true that
pr = pa. We can use this insight to help us solve the maximisation problem. We add the restriction
p = pr = pa to the existing restrictions pi < q for i = r; a. Substituting this rst restriction
into the objective function gives  = 2p
 
42
 1
3 = 2p
 
6
 1
3 = 2p2. Here,  = q   p, so that
@
@p =  1. The rst-order condition for an optimal solution is @@p = 0 ) 22   4p = 0, where
 = (q   p) > 0. This equation can be expressed as p = q3 . The second-order condition on
this maximisation problem is  8 + 4p < 0, which is  8q + 12p < 0. At the stationary point
(which is unique on the range p < q), we have  8q + 12p =  8q + 4q =  4q < 0. Thus,
the second-order condition is satised at the optimal solution. In short, the two optimal prices for
scenario 1 are identical linear functions of quality:
pr = p

a =
q
3
:
Intuitively, the fact that both sides of the journal market are symmetric drives this result.
Authors benet from the marginal reader in the same way that readers benet from the marginal
author. In this case, it is optimal for the journal to increase the reader price as well as the author
price if quality increases.
2.2.2 Scenario 2: Diminishing returns to authors
We now assume (i) nr =
p
na (q   pr) and (ii) na = nr (q   pa). (i) An increase in the total
number of published articles ceteris paribus induces an increase in the number of readers in a
decreasing way. (ii) Intuitively, authorsbenet per article is linear in the number of readers as
brought forward by McCabe and Snyder (2005). In this case, readers benet less from the marginal
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author than authors do from the marginal reader. In Appendix A, we show that the optimal prices
in this scenario are:
pa =
5q  
p
42q2 + 7q
7
; (3)
pr =
21q   42q2   2q
p
42q2 + 7q
49
: (4)
The two optimal prices are graphed in Figure 2.16 For relatively high quality levels, the optimal
reader price is decreasing in quality. This result is consistent with the result brought forward by
McCabe and Snyder (2005) in their scenario where high-quality journals are more likely to adopt
open access. In contrast, however, if quality is relatively low, we nd that the optimal reader price
is increasing in quality. Note that it is not possible for the journal to pay readers, that is, the
reader price cannot be negative. In reality, the optimal reader price equation (4) dictates negative
reader prices for all quality levels exceeding q0, the strictly positive solution to pr(q0) = 0. Figure 2
depicts these negative prices as a dashed curve. Since it is not realistically feasible to pay readers,17
on that range of quality levels the journal would be restricted to the corner solution with pr = 0,
indicated by the continuation of the solid curve along the axis. Thus, the optimal reader price is a
piecewise function.
pr
q
pr, pa
pa
qo
Figure 2: Optimal prices under scenario 2
This also a¤ects the optimal author price. When the reader price is restricted to 0, the optimal
author price is no longer given by equation (3). Instead, above q0, the optimal author price is linear
and equal to q3 .
18 Thus, the author price graph in Figure 2 is also piecewise, as can be seen by the
16 In our simulations, we used  = 1, although it is relatively simple to see that taking any other (positive) value
would not alter the shapes of the graphs obtained, but only their values.
17Most notably, however, Jeon and Rochet (2010) nd that a social planner would subsidise the marginal reader
and choose a strictly negative reader price under the rst-best outcome.
18See Appendix B.
10
kink in the optimal author price graph at q0. The dashed curve is the continuation of the optimal
author price, which would assume that negative reader prices are feasible.
The intuition behind our results is the following. Since authors benet more from the marginal
reader, i.e. for high quality levels and increasing quality, it is optimal for the journal to decrease
the reader price to maintain or even increase readership. This in turn increases prots indirectly
due to its impact on the more valuable author population.
2.2.3 Scenario 3: Diminishing returns to readers
Our third scenario is the opposite of scenario 2. Specically, in scenario 3 we assume (i) nr =
na (q   pr) and (ii) na = pnr (q   pa). (i) Intuitively, readersbenet per article is linear in the
number of articles (authors). (ii) An increase in the total number of readers ceteris paribus induces
an increase in the number of published articles in a decreasing way. In this case, authors benet less
from the marginal reader than readers do from the marginal author. Given the symmetry between
scenarios 2 and 3, it is straight-forward to see that the solution will be exactly opposite to that in
scenario 2, i.e.
pa =
21q   42q2   2q
p
4q2 + 7q
49
;
pr =
5q  
p
42q2 + 7q
7
:
pr
q
pa
pr, pa
qo
Figure 3: Optimal prices under scenario 3
The same comments as for Figure 2 apply, but now the zone of qualities for which the reader price
is set to 0 as a corner solution is q < q0, where q0 is the positive solution to pr(q) = 0. On this
zone, again pa(q) =
q
3 .
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Intuitively, since readers benet more from the marginal author, i.e. for high quality levels and
increasing quality, it is optimal for the journal to decrease the author price to maintain or even
19See Appendix B.
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increase the population of authors. This in turn increases prots indirectly due to its impact on
the more valuable reader population.
2.3 Discussion
Our simulations serve to show a couple of important points as regards pricing. First, the question
which of the production technologies has the decreasing returns seems to be crucial. The diminishing
returns to authors (readers) drive the non-monotonicity of the relationship between the reader
(author) price and quality in scenario 2 (3). In contrast, when both the production of readers
using authors as an input and the production of authors using readers as an input are concave
production processes (scenario 1), the resulting optimal author and reader pricing functions turn
out to be linear functions of quality. Hence, our simulation points to there being no quality levels
for which either price goes to zero. Thus, in that scenario, there is no scope for open access as an
optimal pricing strategy. On the other hand, when the production of readers has decreasing returns
to the addition of authors, but the production of authors is linear in readers (scenario 2), then our
simulation reveals that open access is the optimal choice for the journal (i.e. to charge readers
a price of zero) if the quality of the journal is relatively high (Figure 2). Thus, in this scenario,
open access is a feature of high-quality, rather than low-quality, journals. Third, when it is the
author production process that has decreasing returns to the addition of readers, and the reader
production function is linear, we get the opposite result; open access is a feature of optimal journal
pricing only for very low-quality journals. We can think of logical reasons to support either scenario.
Intuitively, even though additional authors are non-perfect substitutes for producing readers, each
reader has a strict time budget constraint for reading papers. Thus, adding papers is the addition
of a variable (albeit non-perfectly substitutable) input to a xed time input. This would imply
diminishing returns and make scenario 2 realistic. On the other hand, one may realistically assume
that authors have a xed time budget for writing papers. For instance, teaching as well as grant
writing and other administrative tasks may set an upper bound for the xed time budget for writing
papers. In this case, the addition of readers into the author production function is the addition
of new units of perfectly substitutable inputs to a xed time input, which traditionally would be
thought to involve diminishing returns. For this reason, scenario 3 may be realistic. Besides, our
simulations reveal that there is scope for negative author prices in two of our scenarios, something
that is rather rare in the real world of journal management. In scenario 2, we get very low-quality
journals having to pay authors in order to attract them to publish in the journal. In scenario 3,
very high-quality journals pay their authors.
2.4 Comparative analysis
We now compare the three above scenarios graphically. Specically, we look at the level of prot ob-
tained, the level of social welfare, and the share of total social welfare that is retained by academics
(readers and authors), all as functions of q.
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Above, we have already determined the optimal prices in each of the three scenarios. The
remaining graphs are all derived from those optimal prices. The easiest way to understand the
actual equations involved is to recall that the equilibrium numbers of both authors and readers, nr
and na, are both functions of the two optimal prices. Since the two optimal prices are both functions
of quality q, nr and na are also functions of quality. Hence, for either scenario, the equilibrium
level of prots is given by (q) = pr(q)nr(q) + pa(q)na(q). To calculate welfare, we look at the
surplus retained by academics (readers and authors) plus journal prots. To consider the welfare of
academics, we use the well-known concept of consumer surplus. Our demand curves for the journals
services by both readers and authors are linear, thus consumer surpluson each side of the market
is a triangle. Since our demand curves are ni = g(nj) (q   pi), for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, where g(n)
is either
p
n or n, depending on the scenario, the vertical intercept (i.e. the price at which quantity
goes to 0) is q. The area of the triangle on side i of the market is CSi(q) = 12n

i (q) (q   pi (q))
with i = r; a. Given this, total welfare is given by W (q) = CSr(q) + CSa(q) + (q) and the share
of welfare that is retained by academics is given by S(q) = CSr(q)+CSa(q)W (q) .
Table 1 depicts the graphs of the principal variables of the three scenarios.20 Recall that in
scenarios 2 and 3, an unrestricted analysis would set negative reader prices for some ranges of
quality. This is not realistically feasible. Thus, in reality, the reader price would be set to 0. This
has been taken into account in all of the graphs that appear in Table 1. For all of the following
simulations, we have used  = 1.
For all scenarios, the level of prot that the journal earns is strictly increasing in quality.
Thus journal managers will always strive to increase the perceived quality of their publication.
This result is critically dependent upon two assumptions in our model the assumption that the
number of authors will increase with quality, and our implicit assumption that there is a never-
ending supply of both authors and readers. Recall that casual observation of the real world of
journal publishing suggests that for all journals currently being produced, both assumptions are
indeed valid. However, it is worthwhile to think about what would happen if one or the other
assumption were to be violated. First, as already mentioned above, if the quality hurdle to publish
increases su¢ ciently, then at some point the number of authors will begin to decrease as quality
continues to increase. This implies that there will exist an optimal level of quality beyond which
the journal will no longer wish to increase quality. Second, it may be more realistic to consider
the possibility that as quality increases, and more and more readers and authors are added to
the journal, the available population of one or the other is exhausted at some point. In essence,
journals will, at some point, run into a capacity constraint on either authors or readers, that then
will determine the exact level of quality that their journal attains. In that way, our model can also
be interpreted as one of monopolistic competition, where the entire population of, say, authors is
divided into mutually exclusive subsets, one for each journal. The quality of the journal is then
determined by when their allocated number of authors is reached. To model the details of this
20All of the graphs have been generated using the MuPAD 3 package in Scientic Workplace, and they have also
all been independently checked using Mathematica. All of the working behind the actual graphs was also done by
hand. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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process is left for future research. We will revisit the issue of capacity constraints again below in
our analysis of the e¤ects of removal of copyright.
Table 1: Comparison of scenarios 1, 2 and 3
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Prot
0 1 2 3
0
10
20
Profit
q
0 1 2 3
0
10
20
Profit
q
0 1 2 3
0
10
20
Profit
q
Welfare
0 1 2 3
0
50
100
W(q)
q
0 1 2 3
0
50
100
W(q)
q
0 1 2 3
0
50
100
W(q)
q
Share
0 1 2 3
0.0
0.5
1.0
S(q)
q
0 1 2 3
0.0
0.5
1.0
S(q)
q
0 1 2 3
0.0
0.5
1.0
S(q)
q
Social welfare, dened as the total sum of consumer surplus on both sides of the market plus
journal prots, is strictly increasing in journal quality. Thus, the greater the level of quality that a
journal can attain, the higher is the level of social welfare. However, the way that welfare is shared
among the market participants is critically dependent upon the modelling assumptions. In our
scenario 1 (diminishing returns on both production functions), the academics and the journal share
welfare equally regardless of the quality of the journal. In the other two scenarios, the share of total
surplus that is retained by readers and authors will lie within lower and upper limits. As quality
increases, the share of welfare retained by individuals increases, but is never greater than 0.67 in
scenario 2 and 0.75 in scenario 3. On the other hand, it never falls below 0.5 in both scenario 2
and 3. That is, in those two scenarios the readers and authors in aggregate always retain a strictly
larger share of total surplus than the journal (as long as quality is strictly positive).
Consider Table 1. The piecewise element has the greatest e¤ect on the share of academics
welfare in total welfare. In Figures 4 (scenario 2) and 5 (scenario 3) we show larger versions of
these two graphs. Notice that, in scenario 2, the share of academic welfare in total welfare is
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increasing up to the point at which the reader price goes to zero, and is decreasing after that. The
dashed line indicates where this share would go if it were feasible to pay readers. In Figure 5 we can
see the detailed graph of academic welfare as a fraction of total welfare in scenario 3. In scenario
3, the share of academic welfare in total welfare is always increasing, but it is lower than it would
be if readers could be paid on the section of the graph for which the journal is open access.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.5
0.6
0.7
q
S(q)
Figure 4: Share of academic in total
welfare, scenario 2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
q
S(q)
Figure 5: Share of academic in total
welfare, scenario 3
3 The e¤ects of removal of copyright
We can analyse the issue of copyright by simply noting that when there is copyright protection in
place, the journal can act in the market for readers as a monopolist, while if there is no copyright,
then the journal is far more open to competition from other publishers (including authorsown
websites etc.). Thus, assume that the scenarios analysed above are those corresponding to the
existence of copyright protection, and that when copyright protection is lifted (Shavell, 2010), the
journal can no longer choose the reader price, which is then xed at 0. This simplies the model
signicantly.
Now, the prot that the journal earns is equal only to what it can earn from authors. In
Appendix B, we show that the optimal author prices when copyright is removed are pa =
3q
7
under scenario 1, pa =
q
3 under scenario 2 and p

a =
q
3 under scenario 3, respectively. By
comparing these prices with the optimal author prices under copyright we can see that the removal
of copyright serves to increase the optimal author price in all three scenarios. Most notably, high
author fees are necessary for open access to be a sustainable long-run equilibrium and socially
benecial (McCabe and Snyder, 2013b).21 In contrast to the case of copyright protection, now the
optimal author prices in scenarios 2 and 3 are strictly positive, and linear, for all levels of quality.
We now compare the three scenarios both with and without copyright. We evaluate our results
in absolute and relative terms.22 First, we look at the relative comparisons, i.e. we are interested
21Note, however, that McCabe and Snyder (2013b) nd no empirical support for a signicant, positive e¤ect of
online access on citations in the economics and business literature.
22The absolute values of our variables would be altered by simply changing, for example, our assumption on the
value of . However, as we shall see, the absolute value comparison, given , is still interesting.
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in the variable z(q), where z can represent the optimal author price, prots, welfare, or share of
welfare. Let z(q)c be the value of z under a regime of copyright protection, and let z(q)nc be its
value when copyright is removed. Then we are interested in the relative change in z from the
removal of copyright, z(q)nc z(q)cz(q)c . It turns out that in scenario 1, all of the relative changes are
independent of the level of quality, and thus can be given as a specic percentage change. In the
other scenarios, the relative e¤ect from removal of copyright di¤ers as quality changes. In Table
2, all of the graphs shown are piecewise, since even under copyright, the inability to pay readers
implies that for the ranges of quality when it would be optimal to pay readers, the reader price
must be set at 0. Thus, the removal of copyright has no e¤ects at all on those zones of quality.
We can now see that there are some signicant di¤erences between scenarios 2 and 3. While in
all scenarios, the journal loses prot when copyright is removed (on the zone for which they would
like to charge a positive reader price), the percentage loss in prot is decreasing in scenario 2 and
increasing in scenario 3. In scenario 2, the higher the level of quality of the journal, the smaller is
the percentage loss in prots when copyright is removed. The opposite holds true for scenario 3.
Table 2: E¤ect of removal of copyright, relative change
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Author
Price
28:57%
1 2 3
-2
0
2
q
Rel. change
1 2 3
-10
0
10
q
Rel. change
Prot  31:41%
0 1 2 3
-1.0
-0.5
0.0 q
Rel. change
0 1 2 3
-1.0
-0.5
0.0 q
Rel. change
Welfare 15:26%
1 2 3
-1.0
-0.5
0.0 q
Rel. change
1 2 3
-1.0
-0.5
0.0 q
Rel. change
Share 40:49%
1 2 3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
q
Rel. change
1 2 3-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
q
Rel. change
Now we analyse the absolute loss in prots in scenarios 2 and 3. In Figures 6 and 7 we show
the absolute change in prots for these two scenarios. The important thing to notice about Figures
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6 and 7 is the huge di¤erence in the scale of the vertical axis. While the levels of prot attained
are the same under copyright in both scenarios (see Table 1, row 1), the removal of copyright
in scenario 2 results in a relatively small absolute loss in prots at all quality levels (outside of
those for which the reader price under copyright would be set at 0). In contrast, in scenario 3 it
results in a similarly small loss for small levels of quality (below about q = 1:2), but very large
absolute loss in prots for high-quality journals. While the relative e¤ect upon journal prot in
scenario 2 is seemingly large for lower levels of quality, these losses are for very low levels of prot
anyway. Removal of copyright in scenario 2 hardly a¤ects the prots of journals at any quality
levels. However, removal of copyright leads to large prot losses when prots are large in scenario
3, a much more devastating result. If, for example, journals did have some xed costs of operation
(as is likely in the real world), then removal of copyright would only lead to the closure of some very
low-quality journals in scenario 2, but it can lead to the closure of high-quality journals in scenario
3. Hence, the removal of copyright as suggested by Shavell (2010) may be a rather dangerous
strategy in a scenario 3 world.
1 2 3
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
q
Change
Figure 6: Absolute change in prot from removal of
copyright; scenario 2
1 2 3
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
q
Change
Figure 7: Absolute change in prot from removal
of copyright; scenario 3
Regarding welfare, in scenario 2 there is a rather large zone of positive welfare gains in percentage
terms, whereas in scenario 3 the zone of welfare gains is much smaller, and the relative gains are also
smaller. Thus, assuming that social welfare is the policy objective, it would appear that removal of
copyright might be a reasonable policy in scenario 2, but not in scenario 3. This intuition can again
be conrmed by looking at the absolute changes in welfare from removal of copyright in Figures 8
and 9. Again we need to look at the scale of the vertical axis. In scenario 2 (Figure 8), while there
is a very small negative part of the graph23 at levels of quality below 0.2, the scale of these losses is
totally insignicant compared to the gains at higher quality levels. In short, in scenario 2 removal
of copyright leads to hardly any danger of welfare loss, and relatively interesting (upwards of about
20%) welfare gains for almost all levels of quality. On the other hand, consider the absolute welfare
23 Indeed, the negative section of the graph cannot even be discerned unless the vertical scale is changed by a factor
of about 1
100
.
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change in scenario 3 (Figure 9). In this graph there is a positive section between levels of quality
of 13 and about 1:1.
24 The rest of the graph lies below the horizontal axis, and at relatively large
numbers, which implies that the removal of copyright leads to large welfare losses for those levels of
quality. Thus, in scenario 3 the removal of copyright can improve welfare for low levels of quality
but the improvement is miniscule, whereas for higher levels of quality, the change in social welfare
is negative and signicant.
1 2 3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
q
Change
Figure 8: Absolute change in social
welfare from removal of copyright;
scenario 2
0 1 2 3
-20
-15
-10
-5
0 q
Change
Figure 9: Absolute change in social
welfare from removal of copyright;
scenario 3
Finally, we comment on the last row of Table 2. The relative change in the share of welfare that
goes to academics is decreasing in quality in scenario 2 and increasing in quality in scenario 3. If
copyright is removed while we are in scenario 2, total welfare is likely to go up. However, the share
of welfare that accrues to academics drops. If we are in scenario 3, the share of academic welfare
in total welfare rises when copyright is removed, but it is more likely that total welfare drops. We
are also able to perform a welfare analysis for readers and authors separately. It turns out that the
removal of copyright in either scenario leads to less author welfare and more reader welfare, and
the gain in reader welfare outweighs the loss in author welfare.25
4 A consideration of capacity constraints
Above, we have noted that in order to consider some degree of competition in our model, it would
be relevant to impose capacity constraints on both sides of the market. In this way, the journals
market can be considered as a market of monopolistic competition. A full consideration of capacity
24Again this positive part cannot be discerned in the graph, unless we change the vertical scale by a factor of about
1
100
.
25 If we were to consider academics at di¤erent universities, and since the authorship at some universities is sig-
nicantly higher than at others (high-ranked universities versus low-ranked ones on a scale of publications), then
we might want to calculate reader and author welfare separately. At universities with low publication outputs, the
academics are mainly readers. These universities would apparently gain signicantly from removal of copyright. The
same may not be true in universities with a high number of publications. See Mueller-Langer and Watt (2010) for
further details.
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constraints in the simulations we have conducted would require a large number of new scenarios
to consider. We leave this more detailed analysis for future research. However, it is worthwhile to
mention how things would play out.
Under a capacity constraint, the journal is bounded by a certain maximum number of both
readers and authors. The number of readers and authors are both increasing functions of quality
in all of the model congurations that we have used. Thus, although the journals prot is also
increasing in quality, the journal would not be able to set quality arbitrarily high, as at some point
it would run out of either readers or authors. In this way, the capacity constraints would determine
the nal quality achieved in the model.
The introduction of capacity constraints would have important e¤ects when the removal of
copyright is considered. Unless the removal of copyright itself is able to alter the binding constraint
(which would seem not to be logical), the capacity constraints have the potential to intervene in
the welfare analysis of the previous section.
Consider, for example, scenario 1. When copyright is removed, social welfare increases by
around 15% regardless of the level of quality. However, in that scenario, the removal of copyright
will also increase the number of readers and authors at each level of quality. This in turn implies
that the capacity constraint must now bind at a lower level of quality. Hence, in the end the nal
quality that is actually achieved decreases. Following the argumentation of McCabe and Snyder
(2005, 2007 & 2013a), author demand is ceteris paribus less likely to be su¢ ciently inelastic in this
case to support a high author price, which is necessary for open access to be a sustainable long-run
equilibrium and welfare enhancing. Finally, since social welfare is an increasing function of quality,
there is an o¤-setting e¤ect on social welfare that may or may not counterbalance the 15% gain
that is initially found by removing copyright.
Scenario 2 works in a similar way to scenario 1 regarding this capacity constraint e¤ect. Removal
of copyright will initially increase social welfare at almost all levels of quality, but it will also increase
the number of both readers and authors at each quality level. Thus the capacity constraint will
bind at a lower level of quality, and so nal quality achieved will go down.26 The social welfare
gains are, at least partially, o¤-set by the welfare loss of a lower quality level. On the other hand,
in scenario 3, the opposite occurs. In the rst instance, removal of copyright is likely to increase
social welfare at each level of quality, but (at least for high enough levels of quality), the number
of readers and authors are decreased at each level of quality when copyright is removed (again,
for high enough levels of quality).27 The capacity constraint then would bind at a higher level of
quality than before, implying a welfare gain that (at least partially) o¤-sets the losses from removal
of copyright. In this case, author demand is ceteris paribus more likely to be su¢ ciently inelastic
to support a high author price, which is necessary for open access to be a sustainable long-run
26Again, this is assuming that the optimal reader price with copyright was not set at 0. If open access were optimal
under copyright, then of course no e¤ect at all happens when copyright is removed.
27This only happens in scenario 3 when quality is above a certain threshold. However, the threshold is at a relatively
low level of quality, and below this threshold although the numbers of academics served actually increase, the change
is rather innitesimal.
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equilibrium and welfare enhancing.
It is impossible to know which of the two e¤ects (the direct welfare e¤ect at each level of quality
from removal of copyright, or the indirect welfare e¤ect of the change in quality due to the capacity
constraints) is larger. Studying this e¤ect would constitute an interesting extension to the present
paper.
5 Conclusions
All of our conclusions are based upon numerical simulation and particular functional forms, and
thus should be read with due care. The driving mechanism in our model is the e¤ect of an increased
level of quality upon the number of readers and authors, that is, the vertical intercept of our demand
curves. Di¤erent values for this vertical intercept would change our results quantitively, but not
qualitatively. We also remind the reader that the results only apply to a local range of quality
levels, i.e. the range for which quality increases lead to an increase in the number of authors that
are accepted for publication.
Our conclusions are the following. First, it is the nature of the non-linear externalities between
authors and readers that determines whether open access is a feature of low or high-quality journals.
Indeed, we nd that under appropriate prot maximisation on both sides of the journal market,
there exist congurations under which it is the higher-quality journals that will have the open-
access format. This is the case in our scenario 2, where the production of readers (taking authors
as an input) has diminishing returns while the production of authors (taking readers as an input)
is linear. In contrast, open access is never a feature of an optimally priced journal in scenario 1,
where both production functions are a¤ected by diminishing returns.
Second, with regard to the hypothesised removal of copyright for academic works, as suggested
by Shavell (2010), we nd that the removal of copyright will have a di¤erent e¤ect depending on the
conguration of the market. We nd scenarios in which the removal of copyright will have hardly
any e¤ect on prots, but will increase social welfare for almost all quality measures (scenario 2). In
contrast, the removal of copyright will have a serious negative e¤ect on the prots of high-quality
journals such that social welfare decreases in scenario 3. Thus, we cannot unambiguously support
the removal of copyright. On the other hand, we cannot unambiguously support its continued
retention. In our scenario 1, we nd that the removal of copyright is unambiguously social welfare
improving, but it will also have a serious negative e¤ect on journal prots. If the real state of
the world is similar to that of scenario 1, then the removal of copyright is likely to be a benecial
social policy, but it may have to be accompanied by an alternative (author-pays) business model
for publication of scientic work.
This paper suggests several paths for future research. First, it would be interesting to investigate
empirically which, if any, of our three scenarios is most likely to be real-world relevant. Scenarios 1
and 2 provide support for the removal of copyright, while scenario 3 does not. The critical issue is
where the diminishing returns lie; is it the production of readers with authors as an input that su¤ers
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diminishing returns, or rather the production of authors with readers as an input? As indicated in
the discussion of the three scenarios, we can think of logical reasons to support either argument.
A comprehensive empirical examination should investigate this issue. Second, our model has been
calibrated with a single parameter for the e¤ect of increased quality upon the demand for journal
space by both authors and readers. While considering di¤erent values of this parameter will not
alter our model in a signicant manner, it would be of interest to consider that the e¤ect is di¤erent
for authors than for readers. However, it is again very hard to think of convincing reasons why an
increase in journal quality will attract new readers in a notably di¤erent way to how it attracts new
authors. Third, the model generates specic formulas for the number of readers and the number
of authors for each quality level. The ratio between these two gives us the number of readers per
published paper, something that we may associate with the impactof the journal. Further, the
impact factor that is habitually used (e.g. by ISI), which is citations per paper published, can be
seen as nothing more than readers per paper times the probability that any given reader will end
up citing the paper she reads in a follow-up paper. It would be of great interest to identify an
appropriate function for the probability of citing (as a function of the quality of the journal article
read), so that our model may then be applied directly to an analysis of the validity of the ISI impact
factor as an indicator of journal quality. Fourth, it would be interesting to make the number of
authors a non-monotone function of quality in order to endogenously derive a single optimal level of
quality. Fifth, the journal that we have modelled is an online-only product with zero marginal costs.
We would be interested in a version of this model being applied to journals with both hard-print
and online formats, and above all, a journal with a hybrid open-access policy (a policy in which the
author can decide, and pay a corresponding fee to the journal, in order to have the article priced at
zero to readers). Finally, for now we have preferred to look at a monopolistic journal (or at most,
a monpolistically competitive journal) in order to focus on the issue of open access and copyright.
Our model has paid scant attention to competition over journals and the precise manner in which
quality is chosen (i.e. the referee process). Accounting for either or both of these features would
improve the model, although we hypothesise at a signicant increase in complexity.
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Appendix A: Optimal prices in scenario 2 under copyright protection
The two simultaneous equations nr =
p
na (q   pr) and na = nr (q   pa) can be written as
nr =
p
nar; (5)
na = nra; (6)
where i  q   pi for i = r; a. Both nr and na are constrained to be positive. We are restricted
to parameter values such that i > 0 for i = r; a. That is, we can only consider prices that satisfy
pi < q for i = r; a. It is easy to show that the solution to the two equations (5) and (6), outside
the trivial solution at (0; 0), lies at nr = 2ra; na = 
2
r
2
a. The prots of the journal are given by
 = prnr + pana = pr
2
ra + pa
2
r
2
a. From the denitions of the two i functions, we can see that
prot is now a third-order function of each price.
First, consider the optimal reader price. The two derivatives of the prot function with respect
to pr are:
@
@pr
= 2ra   pr2ra   pa2r2a;
@2
@p2r
=  4ra + pr2a + pa22a:
The rst-order condition for a maximum is @@pr = 0 ) 
2
r a   pr2ra   pa2r2a = 0,
where r = q   pr . Extracting the common factor, we have ra (r   2pr   2paa) = 0. Since
ra > 0, we have
r   2pr   2paa = 0: (7)
Substituting for r , this reads q   pr   2pr   2pa(q   pa) = 0. The nal solution is given by
pr =
q   2pa(q   pa)
3
: (8)
This solution is unique on the range pr < q. Since our solution (8) is unique, in order to ensure
that it is a maximum, we need to show that the second-order condition holds at that solution:
@2
@p2r
=  4ra + 2pra + 2pa2a < 0)  4r + 2pr + 2paa < 0:
Equation (7) is 2paa = 

r   2pr . Substituting this into our second-order condition we get
 4r + 2pr + r   2pr < 0 )  3r < 0, which holds for any pr < q. Thus, (8) is indeed a
maximum.
Second, consider the optimal author price. The rst two derivatives of the prot function with
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respect to pa are:
@
@pa
=  pr2r + 2r2a   2pa2ra;
@2
@p2a
=  42ra + 2pa2r :
The rst-order condition is
 pr2r + 2r2a   2pa2ra = 0)  pr + 2a   2paa = 0: (9)
The second order condition is  4a + 2pa < 0, which, upon substituting for a reduces to
pa <
2q
3
: (10)
Now, note that (9) is just  pr + (q   pa)2   2pa (q   pa) = 0 or 3p2a   4qpa   pr +
(q)2 = 0. Using the quadratic formula, we know that the two roots of this equation satisfy
4q
p
162q2 12(2q2 pr)
6 . Simplifying, we get
2q
p
2q2+3pr
3 =
2q
3 
p
2q2+3pr
3 . Using the second-
order condition we see that the higher of these two roots is a minimum whereas the lower is the
maximum. Thus, the optimal author price is given by
pa =
2q  
p
2q2 + 3pr
3
: (11)
In order to nd the exact optimal prices for readers and authors as functions of the journal
quality q, we simultaneously solve the two relevant rst-order equations:
pa =
2q  
r
2q2 + 3

q 2pa(q pa)
3

3
=
2q  p2q2 + q   2pa(q   pa)
3
:
Simple steps then give
2q   3pa =
p
2q2 + q   2pa(q   pa)
) 42q2   12qpa + 9p2a = 2q2 + q   2pa(q   pa).
We get the following second-order equation:
7p2a   10qpa + 32q2   q = 0:
Applying the quadratic formula, we get
pa =
10q p1002q2   28(32q2   q)
14
=
5q p42q2 + 7q)
7
:
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The upper root of this is greater than28 q. So the unique value of pa is
pa =
5q  p42q2 + 7q)
7
: (12)
Finally then, we need to substitute this back in to the equation for the optimal reader price
(8):29
pr =
q   2

5q 
p
42q2+7q)
7

q  

5q 
p
42q2+7q)
7

3
=
21q   42q2   2qpq (42q + 7)
49
: (13)
Appendix B: Optimal author prices when copyright is removed
Scenario 1 When copyright is removed, and the reader price is constrained to be equal to
0, the prot of the journal is given by  = pana = pa
 
2r
4
a
 1
3 . We have r = q, so the prot
function can be written as  = pa

(q)2 4a
 1
3
= (q)
2
3 pa
4
3
a . The rst-order condition30 for an
optimal choice of pa is (q)
2
3


 4
3
a   43pa
 1
3
a

= 0) a = 43pa, which, since a = (q   pa), is the
same as pa =
3q
7 . Recall that under copyright, the optimal author price was
q
3 , thus aside from
reducing the reader price to 0, the removal of copyright serves to increase the optimal author price
by 3q7   q3 = 2q21 .
Scenario 2 There is no need to re-do the optimisation under the restriction that pr = 0. We
only need to use that value of reader price in the equation (11) in Appendix A. Substituting in
pr = 0, and simplifying, we see that the optimal price without copyright is given by pa =
q
3 .
Again, the optimal author price increases with the removal of copyright. In contrast to the case
of copyright protection, now the optimal author price is strictly positive and linear for all levels of
quality.
Scenario 3 The relevant equation from Appendix A (with the subscripts switched to capture
the modelling change) is pa =
q 2pr(q pr)
3 . Clearly, setting pr = 0 gives us exactly the same
author price as in scenario 2, namely pa =
q
3 .
28The upper root is 5q
7
+ 1
7
p
42q2 + 7q > 5q
7
+ 1
7
p
42q2 = 5q
7
+ 2q
7
= q:
29The simplication for this was carried out using the package Mathematica.
30The second-order condition is   8
3

 1
3
a +
4
9
pa
  2
3
a < 0. This is satised if pa < 6

a. Using the denition of 

a,
the second order condition can be written as pa <
6q
7
. The solution to the rst-order condition satises this, and so
we can be assured that pa is indeed a maximum.
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